The Terrible Twos

Can Washington prevent the turbulent Arab Spring countries from going the way of the post-Soviet states?

BY JAMES TRAUB | FEBRUARY 15, 2013

We have reached the second anniversary of the Arab Spring, but no one is celebrating; the divisions inside the "post-revolutionary" countries of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have become so pronounced, and have provoked so much turbulence and violence, that a sense of grim foreboding has almost entirely eclipsed the giddy atmosphere of 2011. Optimism says that we are witnessing the inevitable birth pangs of democracy; pessimism says that the joyous scenes of two years ago will degenerate into yet deeper political and sectarian strife.

I have been trying to think about analogies that could offer some guidance for what the future holds. The obvious one is Eastern Europe after 1989 -- there, too, millions of people flooded the streets to demand freedom, overwhelming the benumbed autocracies which had ruled over them. But the two situations resemble one another only in their birth: Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the like had long traditions of liberal and even democratic rule, and shucked off communism as an alien and despised ideology. Moreover, Eastern Europe was pretty rich by global standards. A slightly closer analogy is Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s; but nations like Brazil and Argentina left behind military rule through "pacted" transitions in which political elites agreed to surrender their power, easing social tensions and creating consensus around democratic rule.

Larry Diamond, the democracy theorist at Stanford University, suggested to me that the most useful analogy is the post-Soviet space, where a dozen new nations with no prior experience of democratic rule left behind a hated system and struggled to create something new. This is not a particularly encouraging comparison. As Diamond points out in his 2008 book, The Spirit of Democracy, nine of those states are authoritarian while the other three -- Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova -- are "illiberal, even questionably democratic, and unstable."

Guarded optimism on the Arab Spring -- if one can still use that inspirational term --consists of the recognition that societies deeply damaged by autocratic rule and economic failure take a generation to heal. It is still very early days. This is still my view. But the Soviet Union passed into history in 1991, and there's precious little democratic light at the end of the Russian tunnel. Steven Sestanovich, a Russia scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, points out that the crowds that filled the streets of Moscow in 1991 were every bit as large, passionate, and as filled with a sense of destiny as those in Tahrir Square. The old system felt just as discredited. But the democratic order created under Boris Yeltsin was simply too weak to curb the energies unleashed by the colossal scramble for wealth as Russia privatized its state-owned resources. Into the ensuing vacuum stepped a strongman, Vladimir Putin.

Egypt's revolutionaries have begun to think of President Mohammed Morsy as their Putin, consolidating power and crushing dissent. But it's much more likely, as Sestanovich observes, that Morsy will prove to be Egypt's Yeltsin, presiding fecklessly over weak institutions and an increasingly fragmented polity. Yeltsin's Russia resisted demands for market reform from the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); Morsy's government has spent months putting off an agreement with the IMF even as foreign exchange reserves dwindle down to a three-month supply. Morsy has been unable or unwilling to curb the hated security forces directed by the Interior Ministry, deepening the outrage at his high-handed political tactics. We should remember that Yeltsin was first seen as a bully, and only later as a weakling. Morsy's own position is hardly secure; he may react to his growing unpopularity by becoming more autocratic, which will in turn provoke more protest.

Still, the post-Soviet space offers many different models. Kazakhstan's oil wealth allows it to buy off protest, as the Gulf states have largely done. The Baltic nations have become fully incorporated into the West, as many Tunisians aspire to be. Ukraine and Georgia, for all their problems, have conducted fair elections in which the incumbent lost, and accepted his defeat. It's not unreasonable to feel hopeful about them.

But here the analogy falters. The people of Ukraine and Georgia, and even more of the Baltics, and still more Eastern Europe, saw in the West -- and in democracy -- the salvation they sought from Soviet rule; nationalism predisposed them to democracy even where historical experience did not. Many people in the Arab world, by contrast, see Islam as the salvation from secular authoritarianism. Not only does nationalism not dictate democracy, but religious identity offers a powerful rival ideology to it, even if the two are not intrinsically incompatible. Even in Tunisia, a nation with one foot in the Mediterranean, the hardline Islamists known as Salafists have derailed what had appeared to be a rough social consensus around liberal constitutionalism. There are still good reasons to feel hopeful about Tunisia. But the question of identity will vex Arab societies much as the question of property did Russia; and only a deep commitment to pluralism will prevent resurgent Islam from splitting these countries apart.

My colleague Marc Lynch has recently challenged academics and policy experts to explain what the United States can actually do to strengthen democratic forces in Egypt. The post-Soviet experience may offer some useful lessons here. First, the United States can only be an anxious spectator on the most primal issues. In Power and Purpose, an analysis of American policy towards Russia after 1991, James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul (now ambassador in Moscow) conclude that, despite concerted efforts by President Bill Clinton,  Washington was able to do very little to influence Yeltsin. Even had Clinton been more willing to speak out in the face of Yeltsin's democratic backsliding, they conclude, the United States probably lacked the leverage to move Russian policy. On the other hand, they add, "words do matter," and Clinton was far too constrained by the fear of losing Yeltsin as a partner on global or regional issues.

That is very much where President Barack Obama stands today with Egypt and Morsy. There's nothing Obama can do to affect the likely Islamic cast of Egypt's new constitution. But the White House's reluctance to criticize Morsy after he played a very useful role brokering a truce between Israel and Hezbollah has made it that much easier for Egypt's leader to follow his worst impulses. Obama seems to have pushed all his chips on Morsy, as Clinton did on Yeltsin -- though the Egyptian leader's secular rivals seem so feckless that it's easy to understand Obama's logic. The Clinton administration pushed a giant $22.8 billion package through the IMF for Russia, which Moscow promptly misused. That won't happen with Egypt, which is now balking at the IMF's conditions. But the Obama administration must adopt a less Morsy-centric policy. "You don't try to pick winners," Larry Diamond says. "You defend the process." And Washington can't issue blank checks, even though Egypt urgently needs financial help. At the very least, U.S. aid should be directed away from the military and towards security sector reform, as Congress is now considering.

The post-Soviet case reminds us that the long term really is long. The United States, Europe, and private actors made a real difference at the climactic moments of democratic upheaval in Georgia and Ukraine almost a decade ago, but now they have to engage in the slow and unglamorous process of training political parties, nurturing civil society, and giving economic advice as well as assistance. Defending the democratic process is an enterprise for the patient. It's way, way too early to despair about the direction of Egypt or Libya, much less Tunisia. (It may not be too early in the case of Iraq.) It's unlikely that any of them will wind up like Estonia -- or, for that matter, Turkmenistan. But they've got a decent shot at Ukraine.

A bull diminished

The economy has slowed, but there are still opportunities around

FOR Brazil’s government recent weeks have brought some long-awaited victories. The overvalued currency has weakened to two reais to the dollar, from its peak of 1.54 last July. At 9% the Central Bank’s policy interest rate is near to historic lows and should fall further after President Dilma Rousseff’s brave decision to cut returns on government-backed savings accounts, which had previously acted as a floor. Both developments were welcomed by manufacturers, who have been labouring under a turbocharged currency and sky-high interest rates for years. Neither, though, was enough to reverse a recent shift in mood against Brazil.

Investors were initially sceptical about Brazil’s inclusion in the BRICs, the acronym devised in 2001 by Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs to group Brazil, Russia, India and China. But macroeconomic stability, falling income inequality and the global commodity boom ensured Brazil’s steady, politically harmonious growth. Strong banks and domestic demand made for a speedy rebound from the 2008 credit crunch. In 2010 Brazil’s economy grew by 7.5% to become the world’s seventh-largest. Brazilians, made vigilant by a history of hyperinflation and debt default, finally relaxed and accepted the applause.

It did not last long. During 2011 Brazil grew just 2.7%. That sat ill with membership of the high-growth BRICs: Russia, India and China managed between 4.3% and 9%. Foreign investors and those who advise them are reporting a new, less starry-eyed approach. “The days of Brazil being given a free pass are over,” says Ivan de Souza of Booz & Company, a consultancy. Some go further: in an article in Foreign Affairs magazine called “Bearish on Brazil”, Ruchir Sharma of Morgan Stanley argues that the country rose with commodity prices and will fall again when they do.

A reassessment of Brazil’s recent performance is overdue. Between 2000 and 2010 Brazil’s terms of trade improved by around 25%; in the past five years private-sector credit doubled. Such tailwinds cannot continue to blow—and even with them Brazil has grown on average by only 4.2% a year since 2006. Only productivity gains, and more savings and investment, can provide fresh puff. Those are nowhere to be seen: IPEA, a government-funded think-tank, puts annual productivity growth for the past decade at a paltry 0.9%, much of it from gains in agriculture. Investment is only around 19% of GDP. Add soaring labour costs and a still-strong currency, and many analysts are lowering their sights for potential annual growth to about 3.5%.

Lower interest rates could give a fresh boost to credit. But not a big one: consumers are already overstretched. Serasa Experian, a credit analyst, says that demand for loans between January and April was nearly 8% lower than during the same period in 2011. Defaults are rising and banks are tightening their terms. Loans that are more than 90 days overdue are now 8% of the total. Itaú and Bradesco, two big banks, saw their share prices fall recently when they upped their provisions against bad loans. Banco Votorantim, which has lent heavily against cars in recent years, has posted three quarterly losses and is rumoured to be a take-over target.

Irritations that were overlooked with growth at 4.5% are likely to resurface when it is nearer to 3%. Taxes are hideously complicated, and take around 36% of GDP, a far higher number than in other middle-income countries. Guido Mantega, the finance minister, points out that the government has cut some taxes, and that tax collection is rising because more businesses are formalising their activities. But Raphael de Cunto of Pinheiro Neto, a São Paulo law firm, argues that the government’s ability to collect taxes has run far ahead of any effort to streamline them, increasing the burden on businesses.

For some, political intervention has supplanted an overvalued currency as the biggest risk in Brazil. Petrobras, a state-controlled oil giant, and Vale, the world’s biggest iron-ore producer, are now being run more to suit government aims than in minority shareholders’ interests, says Joseph Harper of Explorador Capital Management, a fund manager. Such concerns have weighed on both firms’ share prices. Explorador is gradually reducing its Brazil exposure in favour of Peru, Colombia, Chile, Panama and Mexico, where it sees similar opportunities at lower prices, and with less political risk.

Such worries have been amplified by Argentina’s expropriation last month of YPF, a Spanish-controlled oil firm. Though in private ministers are keen to stress that Brazil respects property rights, they are unwilling to irritate an important trading partner or jeopardise Petrobras’s Argentine interests by criticising their neighbour publicly. That is risky: Brazil is indeed different from Argentina, but outsiders may not realise that. The governments of both Colombia and Mexico openly distanced themselves from Argentina’s move.

The threat by a prosecutor to impose huge fines on Chevron, an American oil firm, and jail its executives after a small leak off the coast of Rio de Janeiro earlier this year raises concerns about the treatment of foreigners. Lawyers say that some clients are now asking whether a misstep in Brazil means risking having one’s passport confiscated, as happened to several Chevron executives. The answer is almost certainly not; that the question is even asked is an unnecessary own goal.

A little less Brazil-mania could be salutary. No country has yet been able to abolish business cycles, and some caution now might prevent exuberance from becoming irrational. Even better, it might persuade the government to remove some of the barriers that hold Brazil back. But although overall growth is likely to be modest for some years, there are still plenty of opportunities, particularly in agribusiness and mining, and in catering for growing demand for education, health-care and the like. The new mood, says Mr Harper, is “selectively bullish on Brazil”.

Brasil e China: uma reunião de concertação e cooperação (Valor Econômico)

Fonte: MRE

Tenho a satisfação de copresidir, até amanhã, juntamente com o vice-primeiro-ministro da China, Wang Qishan, a 2ª Reunião da Comissão Sino-Brasileira de Alto Nível de Concertação e Cooperação (Cosban), que constitui o mecanismo formal de mais alto nível nas relações bilaterais com a China.

A Cosban proporciona os canais institucionais necessários ao encaminhamento dos mais variados temas da parceria estratégica Brasil-China. Do diálogo político a temas de comércio e investimentos; da cooperação em energia, ciência e tecnologia à parceria no campo espacial e da educação e cultura, essa comissão envolve uma ampla gama de setores governamentais brasileiros, representando os interesses do empresariado, de instituições acadêmicas e de diferentes segmentos da sociedade brasileira.

Desde a primeira reunião da Cosban, realizada em 2006, quando a parte brasileira foi liderada pelo saudoso vice-presidente José Alencar, as relações sino-brasileiras apresentaram avanços expressivos, tornando-se crescentemente mais diversificadas e complexas. A face mais facilmente mensurável dessa relação nos mostra que, em 2006, o comércio bilateral era da ordem de US$ 16 bilhões, tendo crescido exponencialmente a cada ano, atingindo a cifra recorde de US$ 77,1 bilhões em 2011.

China e Brasil revelaram capacidade de reação rápida e consistente aos efeitos da crise de 2008 e de sua reincidência mais recente, centrada nos países da zona do euro. Os dois países têm importante papel a desempenhar na retomada da economia global e estão comprometidos a assegurar condições para manter seu crescimento interno de forma estável e robusta. Nossos respectivos programas domésticos de inclusão social foram intensificados, em benefício das camadas menos favorecidas de nossas populações.

Desde 2009, a China é um dos nossos principais parceiros comercial e fonte de novos investimentos no Brasil. Em 2011, nosso superávit com a China foi de US$ 11,5 bilhões, equivalente a 38% do superávit global brasileiro.

Com a visita de Estado da presidenta Dilma Rousseff à China, em abril de 2011, foram estabelecidas as bases para um salto qualitativo na parceria. O desafio é o de propiciar meios para irmos além da complementaridade que já caracteriza a relação bilateral. Precisamos, assim, diversificar os fluxos de comércio, de forma a aumentar a participação de produtos de maior valor agregado nas exportações brasileiras para a China.

No quadro da visita da presidenta Dilma Rousseff, houve também entendimentos com vistas a promover a diversificação dos investimentos nos dois sentidos. O Brasil empenhou-se com parceiros chineses no intuito de identificar novas áreas para investimentos, tendo presente a importância que atribui à agregação de valor às nossas cadeias produtivas.

Como resultado desse esforço, de acordo com dados do Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China, o perfil dos investimentos chineses no Brasil, antes concentrados nos setores de mineração, agricultura e petróleo, começou a mudar em 2011. De janeiro a outubro daquele ano, foram anunciados 16 projetos que representam US$ 7,14 bilhões de investimentos diretos chineses no Brasil, dos quais 74% destinados a manufaturas, semimanufaturas e pesquisa e desenvolvimento, além dos investimentos chineses nos setores alimentício, de defensivos agrícolas e de energia.

A parceria Brasil-China na área espacial, iniciada na década de 80, foi redimensionada por ocasião da visita da presidenta Dilma Rousseff, com a decisão do lançamento, até novembro de 2012, do satélite CBERS 3 e, até 2014, do CBERS 4. O projeto CBERS, sigla em inglês de Satélite Sino-Brasileiro de Recursos Terrestres, representa marco pioneiro na cooperação em alta tecnologia entre dois países em desenvolvimento. Estima-se que mais de 50 cientistas brasileiros estejam vinculados ao projeto.

A China será  também importante parceira do Brasil na implementação do Programa Ciência sem Fronteiras, devendo receber anualmente até 100 estudantes e pesquisadores brasileiros no nível de pós-graduação, em áreas de alta especialização. A distância física e cultural permanece um obstáculo a ser vencido. Estamos buscando meios de maior aproximação entre as sociedades brasileira e chinesa por meio do ensino do mandarim em universidades brasileiras e do português na China, do estímulo ao turismo, do estabelecimento de centros culturais nos dois países, e da cooperação no campo dos esportes. Em 2013, será organizado o mês da China no Brasil e, no ano seguinte, o mês do Brasil na China.

A relação Brasil-China transcende a esfera bilateral e ganha contornos de grande relevância, neste momento de redesenho da governança global. Os dois países são parceiros no Brics (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul); no G-20 - onde alinham interesses quanto à reforma das instituições financeiras internacionais; e no Basic (Brasil, África do Sul, Índia e China), onde coordenam posições sobre a temática da mudança do clima. A promoção do desenvolvimento sustentável é tema em que Brasil e China compartilham interesses.

Acolheremos com satisfação a delegação da China à Conferência Rio+20 sobre Desenvolvimento Sustentável, que terá como foco o desenvolvimento da economia verde em contexto de erradicação da pobreza.

Com o objetivo de sistematizar os avanços alcançados e projetá-los em um horizonte de longo prazo, a presidenta Dilma Rousseff acolheu muito positivamente a proposta do primeiro-ministro Wen Jiabao de elaborar um Plano Decenal, que começaremos a elaborar a partir dos resultados da 2ª Cosban, com vistas a sua assinatura por ocasião de visita ao Brasil do primeiro-ministro da China, Wen Jiabao, prevista para este ano.

As relações entre o Brasil e a China são tão amplas quanto diversificadas. A Cosban nos permitirá revisitar os diferentes setores que compõem o mosaico dos interesses bilaterais, sempre dentro da perspectiva de longo prazo e do caráter estratégico que norteia nossa parceria.

Michel Temer é Vice-Presidente da República. 
Data: 13/02/2012

Este pequeno resumo em inglês sobre a Revolução Americana é parte da coleção que está disponível no site da Biblioteca do Congresso Americano. O link está disponível ao final do artigo. Boa leitura!

Equipe Diplomacia e Cultura

Four Centuries of British-American Relations

Some scholars have argued that economics and class conflicts caused the American Revolution. However, most experts now endorse the traditional theory that the Revolution was a political conflict, caused by irreconcilable differences about how the American colonies should be governed. 

By 1776, the British were committed to the view that Parliament must exercise unchallenged authority in all parts of the empire, including the power to tax Americans without their consent. Americans believed that they were entitled to certain fundamental rights, the "rights of Englishmen," which put certain activities beyond the reach of any government.

Inability to compromise on these ideas led in 1775 to an appeal to arms.

Because of the strong bands of law, loyalty, faith and blood uniting the two peoples, many Americans were surprised that a war against the British had occurred. Most Americans believed themselves to be as English as their kin in the mother country, differing from them only in living in another part of the empire. 

Even on the eve of declaring independence most Americans would have been happy with what is today called "dominion status," which would have meant owing allegiance to the British monarch but otherwise enjoying political autonomy.

Since it began in 1775, the fighting was bloody. The Revolution, concluded by a preliminary peace treaty in the fall of 1782, was, after the Civil War, the costliest conflict in American history in terms of the proportion of the population killed in service. It was three times more lethal than World War II.

The brutality of the war convinced leading American statesmen such as George Mason (1725-1792) that enduring hostility would exist between Britain and America. Mason wrote in the autumn of 1778: "Enormities and cruelties have been committed here, which not only disgrace the British Name, but dishonour the human kind. We can never trust a People who have thus used us, Human Nature revolts at the idea."

Although hostility remained after the war, many Americans continued following British ways as eagerly as ever. In the 1790s one of the two leading American political parties sought a "rapprochement" with Britain -- a powerful testimony to the strength of what Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), in the Declaration of Independence, called the "ties of our common kindred."

Four centuries of British-American relations

Pronunciamento do Ministro Antonio de Aguiar Patriota na 319ª Reunião do Conselho de Paz e de Segurança da União Africana, segmento sobre a situação na Guiné-Bissau – Adis Abeba, 24 de abril de 2012

Fonte: MRE

Privilegiamos o diálogo e a diplomacia e privilegiamos a melhor forma de coordenação possível entre os esforços regionais pela paz e o sistema multilateral, personificado nas Nações Unidas. Nesse sentido, o Brasil, país profundamente comprometido com os esforços de integração do seu entorno, vê com respeito e como fonte de inspiração tudo o que já alcançou a União Africana, na véspera de seu 50º aniversário, no plano institucional, e como todos sabem temos uma Comunidade de Nações Sul-Americanas que tem se coordenado com a África por meio das Cúpulas ASA, e considero que podemos incrementar esta coordenação. A meu ver, há muito a se aprender da experiência africana, e continuaremos a trabalhar juntos nesse espírito. Gostaria de fazer um agradecimento especial ao Representante das Nações Unidas para a Guiné-Bissau, Sr. Mutaboba, por seu briefing, bem como ao Ministro da Côte d’Ivoire, representando o Presidente da CEDEAO, Presidente Ouattara, e o Comissário da CEDEAO, por fornecer as balizas para os presentes debates.

 O Brasil condenou veementemente o golpe militar e a interrupção das eleições presidenciais na Guiné-Bissau. Associamo-nos ao comunicado que a Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa – CPLP adotou em 14 de abril, mas da mesma maneira poderíamos ter-nos associado ao comunicado emitido pela União Africana prontamente, se me permitem o comentário, em 17 de Abril, que suspendeu, com efeitos imediatos, a participação da Guiné-Bissau de todas as atividades da União Africana e expressou sua prontidão para acelerar a busca do objetivo de restaurar a ordem constitucional naquele país. Agradecemos também a Angola por sua valiosa contribuição aos esforços em prol da estabilização da Guiné-Bissau e da reforma do setor de defesa e de segurança. 

Talvez mais importante tenha sido a vigorosa Declaração Presidencial emitida pelo Conselho de Segurança, em 21 de abril, que não apenas rejeita o estabelecimento inconstitucional de um conselho nacional provisório pelas lideranças militares na Guiné-Bissau, mas também saúda e apóia a participação ativa e as medidas adotadas pela União Africana, Comunidade Econômica dos Estados da África Oriental – CEDEAO, Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP, e apóia a coordenação desses esforços para a restauração imediata da ordem constitucional. Acredito que se trata de manifestação de grande importância, pois, à medida que olhamos para o futuro, ela nos fornece uma base para um processo inclusivo de coordenação, englobando todos esses atores, processo esse que, acreditamos, deve voltar-se para um esforço de estabilização militar e política sob os auspícios das Nações Unidas.

Acredito que temos aqui uma oportunidade de evitar que a história se repita – e aqui cito o Comissário da CEDEAO –, pois, no passado, apesar de os problemas associados à Guiné-Bissau serem relativamente de pequena monta se comparados a muitos outros desafios, incluindo alguns de que se tratará hoje neste Conselho, a respeito do Mali e do Sudão, estamos lidando com um país de um milhão e meio de habitantes com forças militares relativamente pequenas e um esforço coordenado da comunidade internacional envolvendo todos os principais interessados, o que poderia ter grandes implicações ao enviar uma mensagem de eficácia no trato de desafios à paz e à segurança. Em contraste, um fracasso na Guiné-Bissau transmitiria uma sensação desapontadora de impotência em face de um desafio comparativamente inferior à paz e à segurança.

É neste espírito que o Brasil toma parte nesta reunião hoje, expressando sua prontidão e disposição em continuar trabalhando junto com os países-membros da União Africana, sob os auspícios das Nações Unidas, com vistas a construir um processo de coordenação que leve a um esforço de estabilização, uma missão de estabilização na Guiné-Bissau que permita não só a conclusão do processo eleitoral de acordo com a Constituição da Guiné-Bissau, como também a elaboração de um caminho para estabilização a longo prazo da Guiné-Bissau por intermédio de ações políticas e militares.

Espero poder continuar este diálogo com todos vocês aqui, na América do Sul, em Nova York e em outros fóruns e tenho certeza de que, com base no espírito que identifiquei aqui hoje, teremos êxito. Muito obrigado.

Dilma Rousseff's visit to America

Our friends in the South

Fonte: The Economist
Apr 7th 2012, 14:52 by H.J.

BRAZIL has probably never mattered more to America than it does now. America has probably never mattered less to Brazil. Not that relations are bad between the two countries—far from it; they are increasingly cordial and productive. But America has finally, belatedly, woken up to the fact there is a vast, stable country to its south as well as its north; a country, moreover, with a fast-growing and voraciously consuming middle class that seems to offer salvation to American businesses struggling in a moribund domestic market. Brazil, meanwhile, neither needs loans from American-dominated global financial institutions, nor is it otherwise beholden to the country. The United States is no longer even its biggest trading partner. China took that spot in 2009.

A more balanced relationship may be a more fruitful one too. Since Barack Obama’s visit to Rio de Janeiro and Brasília last year, America has delighted Brazil by removing import tariffs on its ethanol and piloting a scheme to make it easier for Brazilians to get visas—two long-standing bugbears. Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, makes a return visit to Washington in the coming week, and there is much to talk about still. What Brazil wants from America above all is endorsement for a seat on the UN Security Council. Britain has already backed its bid, and during his visit to Brazil Mr Obama made baby steps in the same direction, acknowledging Brazil’s “aspiration”, though stopping short of full support.

That support is unlikely to be forthcoming, at least in the near future. Though Brazil is hardly geopolitically troublesome, its worldview—a hard-to-pin-down blend of pragmatism, relativism and a seemingly indiscriminate willingness to be friends with everyone—is unappealing to the United States. The previous president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was flexible enough to be “my man” to Barack Obama and “our brother” to Fidel Castro. In 2010 Lula stuck his neck out trying to co-broker, with Turkey, an anti-proliferation agreement with Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. That infuriated countries far more important to Brazil’s strategic interests, and left Lula looking silly when Mr Ahmedinejad made no concessions in return. Ms Rousseff has rowed back from that friendship, but it reinforced an impression that Brazil is unpredictable and naive.

Mr Obama will surely want to know, too, what exactly Brazil means by its big new foreign-policy idea. That is to complement the UN’s justification for intervention in another country’s affairs under the rubric “Responsibility to Protect” with “Responsibility while Protecting” after it has gone in. Since Brazil tends not to support going in in the first place, when would it want to see this new responsibility kick in? Even some experienced and sympathetic diplomatic observers in Brasília say they have no idea what concrete difference this would make on the ground.

For America, trade, not diplomacy, will surely be top of the agenda. Judging from the number of American investors turning up in São Paulo every week, Mr Obama must hear about the glowing opportunities Brazil presents in just about every time he meets businessfolk. But with the most overvalued currency of any big economy, Brazil’s own industrialists are prodding the government to keep imports out. It has hiked already-high tariffs on many imports even further, and is taxing foreign-currency inflows increasingly heavily to keep out speculative inflows. Brazil has made it clear it only wants long-term investment, and is only interested in foreign businesses that are willing to make whatever it is they want to sell in Brazil.

If Mr Obama tries to argue for freer trade, he will get short shrift. Both Ms Rousseff and her finance minister, Guido Mantega, regard the floods of cheap money being pumped out by the Fed and the European Central Bank as a far worse trade distortion than Brazilian barriers, which they term “safeguards” rather than “protectionism”. Brazil’s drift towards protectionism is in fact becoming a problem for its own economy. But that is an argument for another day. Mr Obama will surely be aware there is still a lot of mileage to be got out of helping American companies to set up shop in Brazil.

Latin America's history of violence

Fonte: www.dw.de
 

Conflict

 

Murder, rape and mutilations are common crimes in Latin America, considered one of the most violent areas in the world today. Is the violence a legacy of the region's bloody past? A new study examines the phenomenon. 

UN figures show that in Mexico alone, more than 20,000 people were murdered in 2010. In Guatemala, an average of 41 murders per 100,000 residents were committed, in El Salvador, this figure was even 66. In comparison: in Germany, not even one murder - 0.8 cases - per 100,000 people takes place.

The three Latin American countries have all experienced political conflict in their recent past: violent civil wars took place in El Salvador and Guatemala in the 1980s and 1990s. Mexico experienced in the early 1990s an armed uprising of the Zapatistas against the government.

The conflicts in these countries are all considered over for at least a decade now. The violence which still prevails is primarily perceived as being not politically motivated but rather criminal. This is a reason why the continent has hardly played a role in discussions about post-war and post-conflict societies, said Sabine Kurtenbach, author of the paper "The specific features of Latin American post-conflict situations" for the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) at the University of Duisburg-Essen.

Kurtenbach, an INEF associate fellow, said the experience of war or armed conflict was not an adequate explanation for the high degree of violence in the region. If this were the case, all post-war and post-conflict societies would have such problems, she said.

Kurtenbach is also a senior research fellow at Hamburg's GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies.

The causes of violence are complex, according to Kurtenbach's study. In countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala, the experience of war and armed conflict represent a significant factor. The oppressive policies of these governments are accompanied by a lack of willingness to resolve the large gap between poor and rich. Social inequality continued to be a significant factor for the high level of violence in Latin America.

Growing cities and a weak state

Other factors are the speed of urban growth and the dissolution of traditional social ties due to migration into the cities. Criminal youth gangs often take over a substitute role for the family.

However, compared to the usual flight from the countryside into the cities, migration following armed conflicts is significantly more problematic, since a mainly traumatized population in a region is affected.

"This makes the urbanization even more complicated than the classic form due to social change," Kurtenbach said. The risk of violence was increased, since the state for the most part cannot provide the migrants with adequate infrastructure. Organized crime, such as international drug trade, had also led to an increase in violence.

"Transnational networks do not simply spread into a vacuum, but rather go there where there are favorable local factors," Kurtenbach said. A weak state made it possible, especially when the legal system did not function adequately.

Members of the Mara-18 gang behind bars in El Salvador

"Where violence is hardly prosecuted and sanctioned or where state institutions themselves consider violence a legitimate means, incentives are created to employ violence," said Peter Imbusch, an expert for conflict and violence research at the University of Wuppertal.

In post-war societies or countries formerly ruled by military dictatorships, it was an  added predicament when the state security apparatus was part of conflicts, Kurtenbach said. This particularly put into question the ability to reform the security sector. This concretely concerned the downsizing of armed forces, the demilitarization of the police, the subordination of the military under civil institutions, as well as the strengthening of the justice system. Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador continue to struggle to implement planned reforms.

A culture of violence 

Just how much a country deals with its past is a decisive point for its development after a conflict has ended. This is the only way for a society to agree that violence is no longer a legitimate means, Kurtenbach said. But it was not necessarily the case that the inclination to use violence automatically ceased when an armed conflict ended, Imbusch said.

"Violence does not simply emerge in a society that is in a post-conflict situation, but apparently violence is somehow virulent in some form there," he said. However, there were also structures which generally favored violence, for example the "machismo" culture where violence is considered a legitimate means of defending oneself.

The battle against violence in the region can only be won in the long term, Imbusch said. It was important to ease tensions in troubled hotspots through new education and leisure possibilities. This was a good opportunity for German development cooperation.

Bogota is trying to clean up its streets.

In addition, urban development measures could improve the situation, such as is the case in Colombia's capital Bogota. The mayors there across the political spectrum have spent years successfully winning back public space. Dark streets and squares, for example, are better illuminated, so people dare to go back onto the streets again.

Both Kurtenbach and Imbusch agreed that state-imposed repressive measures only have a limited effect, if at all. They often tend to lead to an escalation of the conflicts instead. This was evident in the fight of the Mexican government against drug cartels. Since 2006, at least 50,000 civilians have been killed in the drug war between the military and rival drug cartels.

Author: Christina Ruta / sac
Editor: Michael Knigge